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A central issue in complex networks is tolerance to random failures and intentional attacks.
Current literature emphasizes the dichotomy between networks with a power-law node connectivity
distribution, which are robust to random failures but fragile to targeted attacks, versus networks
with an exponentially decaying connectivity distribution, which are less tolerant to failures but more
resilient to attacks. We prove analytically that the optimal network configuration under a classic
measure of robustness is altogether different from both of the above: in all cases, failure and/or
attack, there are no more than three distinct node connectivities in the optimal network.
PACS numbers: 89.75.Fb, 89.20.Kk, 64.60.-i, 84.35.+i
An outstanding issue in systems as diverse as power
supply [1], transportation [2], communication [3, 4], gene
[5, 6], metabolic [5] and ecological [7] networks is toler-
ance to component breakdown. Recent research on these
and other complex networks has focused on abstracting
from the details intrinsic to each of the systems and rep-
resents them in a unified way as a network of nodes con-
nected by links [8, 9, 10, 11, 12].
Breakdown in a complex network is represented by the
removal of nodes [13] and robustness refers to the ability
of the surviving nodes to remain, as much as possible, in-
terconnected. Two cases of fundamental interest are the
the random removal of nodes, which simulates random
failures of individual elements, and the removal of the
most connected nodes, which simulates a targeted attack
aimed at crippling a network [4, 9, 14].
We report the results of an analysis of the problem of
designing networks to be robust against random failures
and deliberate attacks and obtain a constructive proof
of the most robust network architecture. The network
configurations we find are remarkably simple to describe
qualitatively: They are characterized by the presence of
at most three distinct node connectivities in the network.
A simple but essential measure that is used to cap-
ture the structure of a network is the node degree dis-
tribution: The degree, or connectivity, of a node is the
number of links emanating from it, while the degree dis-
tribution gives the probability that a randomly chosen
node has a given degree. Our analysis applies to the
class of networks, known as generalized random graphs
[15, 16], which are random in every respect other than
in their specified degree distribution. In generalized ran-
dom graphs, potential node degree correlations in the
network [17] are ignored. In particular, in the limit of
a large number of nodes, the fraction of nodes forming
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loops of a given size goes to zero [15, 18].
The robustness criterion we apply is the presence (or
absence) of a giant connected component in the network,
defined as a connected cluster of nodes whose size scales
linearly with the network size N (the total number of
nodes) [16]. This analysis pertains to the case where N
tends to infinity. In particular, note that, given a degree
distribution, N must be large enough so that any degree
with nonzero probability in the distribution is present
in a statistically significant number of nodes in the net-
work. In a phase (or percolation [9]) transition, the giant
connected component disappears under the removal of
more than some critical fraction of the network nodes
[9, 15, 16, 19], with the size of the largest connected clus-
ter then scaling only proportionally to logN [16]. Natu-
rally, the percolation threshold depends on whether the
nodes are removed randomly (random failure mode) or
whether the most connected ones are chosen for removal
first (attack mode): we denote the two distinct thresh-
olds by fr and fa, respectively. This is a topological
robustness criterion, as it does not take into account po-
tential dynamical effects subsequent to the removal of a
node. For an example of interplay between dynamics and
robustness see [20, 21, 22] and for other possible topolog-
ical measures of robustness see [9, 14].
With the above robustness criterion in mind, we define
the optimization problem as follows: Given a fixed aver-
age number of links per node, we determine the node de-
gree distribution that maximizes the percolation thresh-
old. An equivalent view of the problem is that of finding
the degree distribution that minimizes the average num-
ber of links per node while still satisfying a minimal per-
colation threshold, specified apriori, as a desired robust-
ness condition. We shall use these two perspectives inter-
changeably in the rest of the letter. As a final constraint
on the optimization problem, we require that the degree
k of every node in the network satisfies 0< kℓ ≤ k≤km,
where the minimum kℓ and maximum km allowed degrees
are considered given and fixed. We analyze three varia-
2tions on the optimization problem: Optimization against
only random failures, optimization against an intentional
attack and, finally, the most practically relevant case, op-
timization of a network against both random failures and
intentional attacks.
We start with the case of optimization against ran-
dom failures. Let <k> denote the average degree in the
network and <k2> denote the average squared degree.
Then, the percolation threshold fr for a network with a
given degree distribution is given by [18, 19]
fr = 1−
1
<k2>
<k>
− 1
. (1)
Clearly, the optimal degree distribution, which maxi-
mizes fr, maximizes <k
2> for a fixed <k>. Now, the
distribution that maximizes <k2> for a fixed <k> is the
one where all the nodes have either degree kℓ or degree
km, the two extreme degrees. We conclude that the op-
timal degree distribution can be nonzero only at kℓ and
km, with the choice for the exact partition of the distri-
bution between these two degrees being determined by
the value of <k>. We call such a distribution with only
two nonzero values a “2-peak distribution”. Under this
optimal 2-peak distribution, fr can be expressed as
fr = 1−
<k>
−kmkℓ+ <k> (km + kℓ − 1)
. (2)
Fig. 1 shows how two archetypical real networks fair
by comparison: The electrical power grid of the western
United States, which is a network with an exponentially
decaying degree distribution and the internet router net-
work, which is a network with a power-law degree distri-
bution.
We now analyze optimization against intentional at-
tacks. In this case nodes are removed sequentially in
descending order according to their degree, starting with
the most connected node. Let fa be the minimal desired
percolation threshold against attack. Using the gener-
ating function formalism [15, 19], we express in a useful
form the condition for percolation when the fraction fa
of the most connected nodes is deleted [19, 23]. Let us
visualize an attack on a network as described in Fig. 2.
For the purpose of determining the existence of a giant
component, this view of the change in connectivity is en-
tirely equivalent to that of deleting the attacked nodes
and all links emanating from them. However, the gener-
ating functions for this network are now elementary. Let
G0(x) be the generating function associated with the dis-
tribution of outgoing links of a node picked at random
and let G1(x) be the generating function associated with
the distribution of remaining outgoing links of a node
arrived at by following a link emanating from a white
node. Then, with pk denoting the probability that a
node picked at random has degree k and with qk stand-
ing for the fraction of nodes of degree k that are white,
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FIG. 1: Optimization against random failures. Plot of fr
the critical fraction of randomly deleted nodes where the gi-
ant connected component vanishes versus <k> the average
number of links per node in the network, under an optimally
chosen degree distribution - in the sense that it maximizes fr
for a given <k>. A permissible minimum kℓ = 1 and max-
imum km = 8 node degree constraint was also imposed. For
<k> below 8/7 there is no percolation in the network even
with no node failures. Maximum robustness occurs when all
the nodes have km links, in which case the percolation tran-
sition occurs at fr = 6/7. For comparison purposes fr and
<k> for two real networks are plotted: * - Western United
States electrical power grid, an exponential network. o - In-
ternet router network, a power-law network. For the power
grid (kℓ, km) = (1, 19) and for the internet (kℓ, km) = (1, 20)
[24]. The values of fr, <k>, kℓ and km for these real networks
were computed from data in references [3, 25].
FIG. 2: Network under intentional attack. Functional nodes
are white and nodes destroyed under attack are black. A link
between white nodes can be traversed both ways. The non-
functionality of a black node is characterized by having links
to it become one-way incoming links only, i.e., such links work
in the direction leading into the black node, but not going
out of the black node (note: a link between two black nodes
cannot be transversed either way).
we have
G0(x) =
km∑
k=kℓ
pk (1−qk) +
km∑
k=kℓ
pk qk x
k , (3)
G1(x) =
∑km
k=kℓ
k pk (1−qk) +
∑km
k=kℓ
k pk qk x
k−1
∑km
k=kℓ
k pk
.
(4)
Thus, using standard methods [15, 19], the percolation
condition is
G ′
1
(1) ≥ 1 ⇒
∑km
k=kℓ
k2 pk qk −
∑km
k=kℓ
k pk qk∑km
k=kℓ
k pk
≥ 1 .
(5)
3Under attack, the function qk takes the form
qk =


0 for k>k∗
qk∗ for k=k
∗
1 for k<k∗
, (6)
where k∗ is the largest degree a white node may have
after the fraction fa of the most connected nodes in the
network has been darkened. Given this form of qk, we
express the percolation condition (5) as
<k2>k∗ − <k>k∗
<k>
≥ 1 . (7)
This shorthand notation serves to highlight the fact that
the numerator consists of the averages of k2 and k associ-
ated with the original pk distribution modified by trans-
forming all nodes with degree above some k∗ (including
some fraction (1 − qk∗) of the nodes of degree k
∗) into
nodes of degree zero.
We now argue that the optimal distribution against at-
tack is also a 2-peak distribution, namely, one where pk
can be nonzero only at kℓ and at k
∗. Let us consider a
graph with an arbitrary pk degree distribution and with
a fraction fa of its nodes destroyed under attack. Moving
all the probability in the k > k∗ region to the point k∗
affects neither <k2>k∗ nor <k>k∗ and yet it decreases
<k>. In other words, it widens the inequality (7) while
decreasing the average number of links used. We con-
clude that, in the optimal degree distribution, pk=0 for
k > k∗. Now let us consider the probability in the re-
gion k<k∗. By an argument analogous to the one used
for the random failures case, <k2>k∗ can be maximized
while keeping <k>k∗ and <k> fixed by concentrating all
the probability in the region k < k∗ at the extreme val-
ues kℓ and k
∗. Therefore we conclude that the optimal
distribution against intentional attacks is also a 2-peak
distribution with the entire probability concentrated at
kℓ and at k
∗. The optimization problem is therefore re-
duced to finding the k∗ ∈ {kℓ, ..., km} and pk∗ ∈ [0, 1]
values that minimize <k> subject to condition (7). This
is further simplified by noting that, at each candidate k∗,
only the pk∗ value that yields equality in condition (7)
needs to be checked (excluding the trivial case in which
the minimal distribution where all the nodes have degree
kℓ suffices to satisfy the percolation requirement). The
different k∗ candidates are therefore trivially checked nu-
merically. As an aside, note that, unlike in the random
failures case, in the attack case the presence of a km max-
imum allowed degree is not strictly necessary, since the
analysis will always yield a finite k∗.
Fig. 3a shows fa as a function of <k> for an optimal
network. The values of fa and <k> for the electrical
power grid and internet router networks are provided for
comparison. The characterization of the optimal network
robust to a given fa is completed by giving the values of
k∗ and pk∗ , shown in Fig. 3b and 3c, respectively.
We now find the degree distribution for a network that,
while minimizing the average number of links per node
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FIG. 3: Optimization against intentional attacks. (a) Anal-
ogous plot to Fig. 1, except now the nodes are deleted under
attack mode, meaning the nodes are removed sequentially in
descending order according to their degree, starting with the
most connected node. Again, we take (kℓ, km) = (1, 8). *
- Western United States electrical power grid. o - Internet
router network. (b) k∗, one of the two node degrees present
(the other being kℓ) in the associated 2-peak optimal degree
distribution against attack. (c) pk∗ , the fraction of nodes with
degree k∗ in the optimal degree distribution. The discontinu-
ity in the variables is a consequence of the discreteness of k∗.
used, percolates under the loss of a fraction fa of its nodes
under attack and percolates under the loss of a fraction
fr of its nodes under random failure; we demand that
the network satisfy the two percolation conditions sepa-
rately, that is, the specification is not that the network
percolates under a combined fractional loss of fa+fr. In
this case we argue that the optimal degree distribution
can be a 3-peak distribution - it’s nodes have only one
of three possible degrees: kℓ, km and an in between de-
gree k∗, where the previous definition of k∗ continues to
hold. Let us consider an arbitrary degree distribution
pk. Moving the entire probability in the region k<k
∗ to
the extremes kℓ and k
∗ while keeping <k> and <k>k∗
constant (same condition), has the effect of maximizing
<k2> and <k2>k∗ . This benefits both the robustness
against attacks, equation (7), and the robustness against
random failures, equation (1). We conclude that there
are no nodes with degree in between kℓ and k
∗ in the op-
timal degree distribution. We now turn to the probability
in the region k>k∗. As far as robustness against random
failures, equation (1), moving all the probability to the
extremes k∗ and km while keeping <k> constant, max-
imizes robustness by maximizing <k2>. On the other
hand, robustness against attack, equation (7), is not af-
fected by the placement of the probability in the region
k > k∗ as long as <k> is kept constant, since <k2>k∗
and <k>k∗ are not affected. We conclude that there are
no nodes with degree in between k∗ and km in the opti-
mal degree distribution. Therefore, we have shown that
the optimal distribution can have at most three distinct
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FIG. 4: Simultaneous optimization against intentional attacks
and random failures. We take (kℓ, km)=(1, 8). To each com-
bination of desired minimal network percolation thresholds,
fa under attack and fr under random failures, corresponds
an optimal network, i.e., one that also minimizes <k>. (a)
These optimal networks can be divided into different qualita-
tive classes, illustrated using different colors: A - Robustness
to these (fa, fr) pairs is not attainable due to the km con-
straint. B - fr is the limiting constraint. There are two node
degrees present in these networks, kℓ and km. C - fa is the
limiting constraint. There are at most two distinct node de-
grees in these networks, kℓ and k
∗. D - Both fa and fr affect
the optimal degree distribution. These networks still have just
two distinct node degrees, kℓ and k
∗ (i.e., the potential third
degree, km, turns out to have zero frequency). E - As in D,
both fa and fr affect the optimal degree distribution but there
are now three distinct node degrees in the network, kℓ, k
∗ and
km. (b) Contour plot of <k> for the optimal networks. The
<k>= km = 8 contour represents the maximum achievable
robustness. For comparison, the (fr, fa) robustness thresh-
olds of two real networks were plotted: * - Western United
States power grid (exponential network), o - Internet router
(power-law network). For the power grid <k>=2.7 and for
the internet <k>= 2.5. Note how the points fall below the
respective optimal <k> contours.
degrees. The exact qualitative form of the distribution
depends on the combination of fr and fa. The different
possibilities are outlined in Fig. 4a, using a color coding
scheme. Fig. 4b shows the <k> of the optimal network
associated with each given (fr, fa) pair. We note that
numerically only a limited number of potential solutions
need to be checked to find the optimal architecture. This
limited checking follows because, for the cases in which
the solution is determined by a combination of fa and fr,
it can be shown that if the optimal solution is a 2-peak
distribution, then equality holds in (7), while if the op-
timal solution is a 3-peak distribution, equality (1) also
holds in addition to (7). Therefore the potentially op-
timal values of pk∗ and pkm can always be expressed in
terms of the candidate k∗.
In this letter we have shown that the network con-
figurations that maximize the percolation threshold
under attack and/or random failures have at most
three distinct node degrees. From a practical point of
view, both engineered and naturally occurring networks
have a diversity of factors influencing and constraining
their ultimate configuration. Nonetheless, the optimal
configurations we present provide a yardstick against
which the robustness of real networks can be compared
and act as an intuitive guide for network-robustness
engineering.
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